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achieving a Free trade area of the  
asia-Pacifc: does the tPP present the  
most attractive path? 
MEREDITH KOLSKY LEWIS 
Tis chapter examines the prospects for the trans-Pacifc Partnership
(tPP) to expand into a Free trade area of the asia-Pacifc (FtaaP). It
does so by comparing the tPP to other potential models for asian eco-
nomic integration, and by identifying what factors might enhance or
diminish the possibility of the tPP serving as the FtaaP model. 
First, the chapter briefy traces the history of the tPP and its linkage to a 
potential FtaaP. Second, it examines other potential models for regional 
economic integration and discusses the pros and cons of each option for
the major economies in the region. Tird, it discusses reasons why the
tPP might or might not be the preferred model, identifying important
factors playing into this calculus. 
1 Te origins of the TPP-FTAAP linkage 
Te concept of an FtaaP has been bandied about for the past sev-
eral years. C. Fred Bergsten has been a particularly strong advocate
of this idea, espousing the pursuit of the Bogor goals of free trade and
investment regimes throughout the asia-Pacifc Economic Cooperation 
(aPEC).1 aPEC initiated a study of the FtaaP concept in 2006, and
in 2009 pledged to explore pathways to create an FtaaP.2 Bergsten’s
early writings3 on the subject assumed the only way an FtaaP could
be accomplished would be to take the existing regional Ftas and
1 See Bergsten (2005). 2 See aPEC (2010). 
3 Ibid. (“Te question before this panel is: ‘Squaring Ftas with the Bogor Goals: How Can 
it be Done?’ Te honest answer is that it can only be done, over time, by rolling the indi-
vidual Ftas and Economic Partnership agreements (EPas) and otherwise-named sub-
regional trade agreements into a single Free trade area of the asia Pacifc.”) 
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224 MEREDITH KOLSKY LEWIS 
agreements and combine them into an FtaaP. More recently, however,
Bergsten has seized upon the tPP as the basis for an ultimate FtaaP.4 
aPEC has similarly evolved in its approach towards achieving an 
FtaaP. as recently as its November 2010 meeting, aPEC identifed pos-
sible pathways as follows: “We believe that an FtaaP should be pursued 
as a comprehensive free trade agreement by developing and building on
ongoing regional undertakings, such as aSEaN+3, aSEaN+6 and the
trans-Pacifc Partnership, among others.”5 However, following the 2011
aPEC meeting, the focus now appears to be more squarely on the tPP. In 
an op-ed published in December, aPEC Secretariat Executive Director
ambassador Muhamad Noor noted that “aPEC Leaders have agreed that 
the tPP could become a building block for a much-wider Free trade area 
of the asia-Pacifc, a long-term aPEC goal,”6 and that the tPP’s object-
ives (including increasing trade fows and being open for inclusion of new 
participants) “suit[ ] aPEC’s agenda, particularly given our vision for a
Free trade area of the asia-Pacifc.”7 
We therefore have a number of interesting dynamics occurring. One
is that aPEC has taken a consistent approach over the past few years
that an FtaaP is desirable. a second is that the discussion of potential
models for such an FtaaP have shifed from a view that existing bilat-
eral agreements would need to be somehow combined, to a belief that an 
FtaaP will grow out of a single arrangement, be it the tPP, aSEaN+3,
aSEaN+6 or an aPEC-based Fta. and more recently, there has been 
increased emphasis on that single arrangement being the tPP. 
Notwithstanding the current interest in the tPP, some aPEC countries 
may prefer that an alternative agreement serve as the foundation for an
FtaaP. Tus, this chapter examines the alternatives to the tPP. Before
doing so, this section briefy traces the connection between the tPP and
an FtaaP. 
as discussed in Chapter 2 of this volume, the tPP has grown out of a
precursor agreement, the trans-Pacifc Strategic Economic Partnership
agreement, more colloquially known as the P4, which is a linkage
between New Zealand, Singapore, Chile and Brunei Darussalam. Te P4
members did not join together for purposes of expanding their economic
markets amongst themselves, but rather sought to form a high-standards
4 See, e.g., aPEC’s trade agenda presents possibility, problems (interview with Bergsten 
originally published in the Asahi Shimbun), November 10, 2010. available at http://news. 
xinhuanet.com/english2010/indepth/2010–11/10/c_13600034.htm (accessed January 30, 
2012). 








      
 











                







225 ACHIEVING A FREE TRADE Area 
agreement that could serve as a model for an ultimate FtaaP. Te P4
therefore included features that were intended to attract other countries
to join. In particular, it has an open accession clause, which encourages
other economies to negotiate to accede to the agreement;8 and it is in
substance a highly comprehensive agreement. Te idea was to liberal-
ize broadly and comprehensively; this is particularly notable in the con-
text of trade in goods, where the P4 members agreed to liberalize trade
on all goods, with the exception of minor exclusions claimed by Brunei
Darussalam for non-economic reasons.9 
Initially, this agreement did not appear to attract much attention.
However, the P4 text provided that negotiations pertaining to fnancial
services and investment would commence two years afer the agreement 
came into force. Te agreement came into efect in 2006, and the members 
accordingly planned to hold the investment and fnancial services negoti-
ations in the frst quarter of 2008.10 When the time neared for those nego-
tiations to commence, the ofce of the United States trade representative 
(UStr) issued a press release indicating it intended to participate in these 
negotiations.11 It suggested that if these negotiations went favourably, it
would be interested in these negotiating to join the agreement in full.
Tis resulted in a wave of other countries – australia, Peru and Viet Nam 
in the frst instance –expressing their interest in participating as well. 
Te US already had Ftas with Singapore and Chile, and had long
rebufed New Zealand’s overtures to negotiate a bilateral arrangement.12 
8 For a discussion of open accession clauses in Ftas, see Lewis (2011a). 
9 Te P4 does not require Brunei Darussalam to liberalize with respect to alcohol, tobacco, 
opium or frearms. Tese products are excluded pursuant to exceptions provisions in the 
P4 that allow measures to protect, inter alia, public morals and human health. See trans-
Pacifc Strategic Economic Partnership agreement, art. 11.22 (the P4 general exceptions 
provisions). 
10 See MFat (2008). 
11 See “United States to Join Sectoral Negotiations with Four asia-Pacifc Countries
Will Explore Participation in Broader Strategic Partnership agreement,” USTR News
(February 4, 2008). available at www.sice.oas.org/tPD/tPP/Negotiations/USjoins_ 
inv_serv_e.pdf (accessed on January 23, 2012). 
12 Tis was due to a number of factors. Historically, the US had told New Zealand there 
would never be a free trade agreement so long as New Zealand refused to allow US ships 
carrying nuclear material in New Zealand waters. In addition, it is likely that even with-
out New Zealand’s no nukes policy, the US would not have been enthusiastic. On the
market access potential front, New Zealand has a small economy of only 4 million people 
and already has relatively low tarifs, meaning increases in exports would only be modest 
at best. On the fip side, New Zealand exports signifcant quantities of dairy products,
which the United States generally treats as sensitive, as well as other agricultural prod-









          
 
           
        




    
   
 
 





              
 
 







226 MEREDITH KOLSKY LEWIS 
Clearly access to Brunei Darussalam’s small market was not the driver.
Instead, the United States’ interest in the agreement was clearly tied to its 
potential to expand. Tis remains the case today, as the other countries
that have joined the negotiation also provide little in the way of new mar-
ket access opportunities for the US. In addition to the Ftas mentioned
above, the US also has Ftas with Peru and australia. Tus, the current
group of nine only provides new linkages for the US to four participants – 
Brunei Darussalam, New Zealand, Malaysia and Viet Nam.13 
although at times UStr ofcials and the UStr website have posi-
tioned the tPP as attractive because it provides a good market access
opportunity, the United States 2010 trade Policy report perhaps tells a
more accurate story: “U.S. participation in the tPP agreement is predi-
cated on the shared objective of expanding this initial group to include
additional countries throughout the asia-Pacifc region. Several add-
itional countries already have expressed initial interest in participat-
ing in the agreement.”14 While the UStr has primarily discussed the
agreement in terms of its longer-term market access potential, others
have been more forthright in identifying its broader strategic implica-
tions. For example, Kevin Brady, the chair of the House Ways and Means
trade Subcommittee, gave a speech in 2011 in which he said that the
tPP “at least begins the process of positioning the US as a counterweight
to China in the asia-Pacifc region.”15 Presumably Brady’s statement
refects one of the administration’s true objectives in pursuing the tPP.
Several diferent models have been proposed for East asian economic
integration, potentially resulting in the formation of an FtaaP. Until
the tPP, none of those models included the United States. Te US there-
fore has been facing the prospect of a world with three major economic
trading blocs: the americas, the EU and an asian bloc. Te americas
would be the weakest of these three; however, the tPP provides at least
a prospect for an asia-Pacifc bloc that would combine large portions
of the americas with the major asian economies. Such a development
would have a number of positives for the US. First, it would place the US 
squarely in the thick of the asia-Pacifc bloc, rather than sitting on the
wrong side of a divided Pacifc. Second, should the agreement expand
13 On the eve of the November 2011 aPEC summit, Japan announced its intention to join 
the tPP negotiations. Tis decision was closely followed by statements by Canada and
Mexico that they too intend to join. However, it is unclear whether these countries will be 
willing to make the substantive commitments required. 
14 UStr (2009). 



























227 ACHIEVING A FREE TRADE Area 
into an FtaaP, this would have the US in the more powerful of two
major blocs, rather than in the weakest of three. and third, the tPP will
give the US some regional preferences that will help it respond to a degree
to increasing competition from China. 
Now that the tPP has emerged as an alternative path towards an
FtaaP, it is an opportune time to examine the major alternative FtaaP 
models and identify their strengths and weaknesses. 
2 Possible avenues for Asian economic  
integration – pros and cons 
2.1 ASEAN+3/EAFTA 
Te aSEaN+3 model would see the ten aSEaN countries combined with 
China, Japan and the republic of Korea (henceforth Korea) in a single
Fta, sometimes called the East asian Fta or EaFta. Tis approach has 
been promoted by China over the past few years.16 Te EaFta model has 
been viewed with some caution by Japan, which is concerned that such
an agreement would be imbalanced, with China being by far the largest
economy. China’s motivation seems in part to be to have a central role, but 
also to propose a model that excludes the United States. 
at present, aSEaN already has a series of aSEaN+1 agreements
that include agreements with China, Japan and Korea. Tus on the sur-
face, the idea of aSEaN+3 seems simple. However, in order to have an
aSEaN+3 that is a single, integrated Fta rather than a hub and spokes
system, China, Japan and Korea will need to negotiate with each other –
something that has been the subject of discussion, but which has not yet
risen to the level of negotiations. China has proposed an Fta between the 
three major East asian economies, and Japan and Korea agreed to study
this idea. Prior to the 2011 aPEC summit, there did not seem to be sig-
nifcant momentum for this concept. However, in January 2012 the three 
countries indicated their intentions to begin negotiating a tri-party Fta
later in the year.17 Press reports refected the advances of the tPP that had 
led China to increase its pressure on Korea and Japan to begin trilateral
negotiations as soon as possible: “Trough the tPP, the US expects to take 
a dominant position in the integration of economies of the asia-Pacifc























228 MEREDITH KOLSKY LEWIS 
region and expand its exports to the region … But China cannot just
wait and see. and it should actively promote the progress of the Fta
talks.”18 
2.2 ASEAN+6/CEPEA 
Japan has propounded a diferent model as a preferred alternative to the
aSEaN+3. Japan’s proposed model, sometimes called a Comprehensive
Economic Partnership in East asia, or CEPEa, would comprise the
aSEaN+3 countries, with the addition of australia, New Zealand and
India. Tis approach is also called aSEaN+6.19 Tis is seen as a model
that would provide more of a counterbalance to China, and would
adopt a more expansive approach to the region than just East asia.
Unsurprisingly, australia, New Zealand and India also prefer this model
to aSEaN+3. 
at present aSEaN has hub and spoke agreements with all of the poten-
tial +3 and +6 partners, as it has negotiated separate Ftas with India,
China, Japan and the republic of Korea, and a single Fta with australia 
and New Zealand. However, the spokes do not at present all have Ftas
amongst themselves. Tere are a number of Ftas across the spokes, how-
ever, so an integrated aSEaN+3 or +6 is not beyond the realm of possibil-
ity. aSEaN has been able to negotiate so many aSEaN+1 agreements in 
part because its agreements generally are less than fully comprehensive,
making them easier to negotiate. 
2.3 APEC 
Initially, the discussion of an FtaaP arose from aPEC. Indeed, historic-
ally aPEC has a long-term goal of free trade across aPEC members. It has 
supported this concept by, inter alia, encouraging open accession provi-
sions in Ftas and promoting fully comprehensive, high-standard agree-
ments. Yet, aPEC has not emerged as the driver for an FtaaP. Tis is in 
part due to aPEC’s diminished role following the asian fnancial crisis in 
the late 1990s. aPEC did not prove itself able to promote major reforms or 
to take the lead in responding to the crisis, and this suggested that aPEC 
18 See Mainichi Daily News (2012). 
19 Te aSEaN countries themselves have taken a somewhat pragmatic approach, suggest-
ing that the aSEaN+3 and aSEaN+6 proposals be studied simultaneously. Ibid. 
 
       
 























229 ACHIEVING A FREE TRADE Area 
was not strong enough to serve as the motor for economic integration.
Instead, aSEaN has largely flled that void.20 
Nonetheless, recently there has been signifcant discussion within 
aPEC regarding an FtaaP and the need to study various models for
such an agreement. It has identifed aSEaN+3, aSEaN+6 and the tPP 
as potential models, but has not as yet stated a preference for any one of
these.21 However, at the 2011  aPEC meeting, increased attention was  
directed towards the tPP as President Obama formally outlined details
for the agreement.22 
3 Te TPP as FTAAP model? 
Te tPP provides an alternative to the aSEaN+3 and aSEaN+6 models 
discussed above. It difers in a number of important respects – in some
ways that may enhance its potential for serving as an FtaaP model, and 
in others that detract. a selection of these factors is discussed below. 
3.1 Ease of accession 
In order for the tPP to expand into an FtaaP, it will need to absorb many
additional countries into its membership. Te ease or difculty of this pro-
cess may afect some countries’ interest in, and willingness to, participate. 
a major issue in the tPP negotiations thus far has been that of
“modalities” – whether the agreement will comprise a series of bilateral
market access agreements with an overlay of common new understand-
ings, or whether instead the entire agreement will be unifed, with a sin-
gle market access schedule for each country. Te resolution of this issue
may signifcantly impact the tPP’s prospects for further expansion.23 
Beginning in the initial rounds of tPP negotiations, the United States
took the position that it intended to negotiate new bilateral market access
arrangements with the countries with which it did not already have free
trade agreements – namely New Zealand, Brunei Darussalam and Viet Nam. 
Tis approach was extended to include Malaysia when it joined the negoti-
ations as a full member in October 2010. Te US intent was that its market
20 Of course, aPEC’s large diverse membership would make it exceedingly difcult to nego-
tiate an aPEC-wide agreement all at once. If the size alone were not enough, the russian 
Federation is fnishing accession to the WtO and Chinese taipei presents its own chal-
lenging issues. 
21 See aPEC (2010). 22 BBC News asia (2011). 
23 For more detailed discussion on this issue, see Lewis (2011b). 
  
 
   
 







            
           
  
 










230 MEREDITH KOLSKY LEWIS 
access commitments with respect to existing Fta partners australia, Chile, 
Peru and Singapore would not be reopened or renegotiated.24 
this approach was opposed by New Zealand, Singapore and
australia.25 Tese members argued that it would be preferable to have
a single market access schedule. Ultimately the issue has been tabled
for future negotiation, but its resolution may be pivotal for the future
prospects of the tPP. 
It is understandable at one level why the United States initially pro-
posed a series of bilateral agreements as the modality for market access.
It would of course prefer not to have to make new commitments to its
current Fta partners. and this would be an issue: under the terms of
existing Ftas, the United States has excluded a variety of products from 
coverage. For example, under the australia–United States Free trade
agreement (aUSFta), the United States excluded sugar from its commit-
ments. accordingly, australia’s sugar producers obtained no new market 
access to the US market as a result of the aUSFta. If under the tPP the
terms of existing Ftas were to remain in place, the US could continue to 
maintain its exclusion of sugar from australia. 
although the initial US position makes sense from the standpoint
of not wishing to give new concessions to its existing Fta partners, in 
a broader sense, this position may undermine the potential of the tPP 
to expand into an FtaaP. a series of bilateral arrangements would be
far less attractive for potential new entrants than would a single agree-
ment with unifed market access schedules. For a non-member looking
in, it would presumably prefer negotiating one schedule rather than ten or 
more. Te bilateral approach refects the previous wisdom that an FtaaP 
would have to be created by patching together the region’s many vari-
ous Ftas. However, that approach is arguably more difcult than starting 
anew with one fresh agreement. Linking together existing agreements is
made enormously complicated by difering rules of origin across agree-
ments. Tis problem can be resolved by starting from scratch with a new 
agreement in which a single approach to rules of origin (rOO) is defned, 
and then requiring new entrants to accept that rOOs system. 
For the moment, the issue of modalities has been largely put on hold.
Te US has tabled its goods market access ofers only to New Zealand,
Brunei Darussalam, Viet Nam and Malaysia.26 at the same time, other
participating countries such as australia have made their ofers on a
24 See Inside US trade (2010b). 25 Ibid. 






            
 
               
 
         




          
            
 
          
 
  
            
  
 









231 ACHIEVING A FREE TRADE Area 
plurilateral basis. Tus for now, there are both bilateral and plurilateral
ofers on the table.27 Some reports suggest that the US remains open to
negotiating a unifed schedule at the end of the day. It has, at a minimum,
indicated that there will be some aspects of commonality, but that it is
deferring for now decision of how far that commonality will extend.
In striking a balance between the desire to attract more members on 
the one hand, and not wishing to make signifcant new commitments
to existing Fta partners on the other, the US may elect to agree to a
unifed market access schedule, but then to insist upon product-specifc
rules of origin that will minimize the potential for non-tPP partner
content to be entitled to the tPP rate.28 Tis approach would lead to 
fewer products qualifying as having origin from a tPP partner country
than would a more liberal approach to rules of origin. 
3.2 Participants 
Te most likely alternatives to the tPP, as discussed above, are either
aSEaN+6 or aSEaN+3, or perhaps a new model with a China–Japan– 
Korea Fta at its core. all of these models have three things in common:
(i) the participation of the three major asian economies, China, Japan 
and Korea; (ii) the exclusion of the United States; and (iii) the exclusion 
of any other economies from the americas side of the Pacifc. In contrast, 
the tPP at present features South american participants, the United
States, and lacks full participation by any of the major three asian econ-
omies.29 However, the latter point of diference may soon narrow. Japan 
has recently indicated its intent to participate in the tPP negotiations.
In addition, the ratifcation in late 2011 of the KOrUS Fta by both the
United States and Korea makes it more politically feasible for Korea to
enter into a new Fta negotiation with the United States, should it wish
to do so. Tus, while the tPP at present contains none of the three largest 
asian economies, most pointedly it excludes China. 
27 See Inside US trade (2011a). 
28 See Inside US trade (2011c) (discussing, inter alia, a yarn-forward rOO for textiles
and apparel, which would mean that if a garment were produced in Viet Nam from
yarn sourced from a non-tPP country, that garment would not be deemed a product
of Viet Nam for rOO purposes; and other product-specifc rules of origin relating to
dairy and sugar). 
29 In November 2011, Japan announced its intention to join the negotiations. at this time it 










   
        
            









   
  
 







232 MEREDITH KOLSKY LEWIS 
For some asian economies (particularly China), the absence of the
United States is presumably positive, and any of the alternate models
would be preferable to the tPP. On the other hand, other non-members
that do not currently have an Fta with the United States may fnd the
market access possibilities of the tPP the most attractive of all the models. 
Given the aSEaN+1 agreements already in existence, the biggest market 
access gains for most asian countries would arise out of the new link-
ages to the US and, to a lesser extent, the Latin american participants.30 
Further, given concerns about China’s economic and military might,
some asian countries may welcome the US playing a greater role in the
region, and the opportunity to forge linkages with the US. 
Defnitions of “asia-Pacifc” are variable, and there is no single agreed-
to formulation. Tat said, it is easier to envision an agreement wearing the 
mantel of “FtaaP” that excludes the United States, than one that does
not include China, Japan or Korea. amongst the current tPP members,
the United States has by far the largest economy, with an estimated GDP 
of US$14.6 trillion. Te US is followed by australia (US $1.22 trillion);
Malaysia, Singapore and Chile come in next all around US $200 billion,
with the other economies far smaller.31 It is essential to add other, lar-
ger economies for the agreement to have any prospect of becoming an 
FtaaP.32 But how likely is this? 
3.2.1 republic of Korea 
Korea is the smallest of the big three East asian economies, but
would have the easiest path to tPP accession. Since Korea has already
negotiated an Fta with the United States, it has made the most sig-
nifcant market access concessions required already. KOrUS required
Korea to open up its market to US beef exports, causing signifcant
domestic unrest. However, Korea was able to overcome its domestic con-
cerns, and acceding to the tPP would be relatively straightforward in
30 aSEaN has Ftas with China, Japan, Korea, India, and a single agreement with australia
and New Zealand. More information regarding aSEaN Ftas can be found on aSEaN’s
website. available at www.aseansec.org/4920.htm (accessed January 30, 2012). 
31 Statistics available at www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/felds/2195. 
html (accessed January 30, 2012). Te three major East asian economies have signifcant 
GDPs: China’s is reported at US $5.7 trillion, considered an understatement, as it has
been calculated using ofcial exchange rates which are widely viewed as undervaluing
the Chinese currency; Japan’s is US $5.39 trillion; and Korea’s is US $986.3 billion. 
32 See Inside US trade (2010e). 
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233 ACHIEVING A FREE TRADE Area 
comparison. Korea already has Ftas with most of the major participants, 
so would not see signifcant negative domestic impacts to joining. In add-
ition, Korea has taken a very active approach to negotiating Ftas with
large economies. Besides KOrUS, it has also recently concluded an agree-
ment with the EU, and is negotiating agreements with Canada, australia 
and several other countries.33 
Will Korea join the tPP? It was prudent in the frst instance for Korea 
to forgo participating, pending the ratifcation of KOrUS in the US and
Korea. However, the Fta has recently been ratifed by both countries34 
and it will be interesting to see if Korea will now seek (or agree) to join.
Te current tPP partners have already made an overture to Korea, asking 
it to join the talks before the frst round of negotiations in 2010.35 During
the last aPEC forum held in Yokohama, Japan in November 2010, Korea’s 
President Lee Myung-bak indicated that his country was considering
joining, but noted that he was uncertain whether its efect would be any-
thing more than symbolic in the quest to achieve an FtaaP.36 Certainly
for Korea itself, the tPP may not lead to very much in the way of new
market access. and on the fip side, Korea would need to agree to lib-
eralize its agricultural sector more than it has been willing to thus far.
Samsung Economic research Institute economist Park Bun-soon has
expressed pessimism that Korea will take this step: “Te tPP requires
tearing down tarifs in all areas including the agricultural sector and can 
Korea do that now? I don’t think so … Korea doesn’t seem ready for the
tPP.”37 However, Korea has taken a pragmatic approach to its Fta pol-
icy, and if Japan’s decision to participate proves to bear fruit, Korea may
decide it needs to do so as well. 
In a fascinating development, Japan’s Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda
announced just prior to the November 2011 aPEC Summit that Japan 
33 For a complete list of Korea’s Ftas in efect, concluded under negotiation and under
consideration, see www.mofat.go.kr/english/econtrade/fa/issues/index2.jsp (accessed
January 30, 2012). 
34 Te United States ratifed KOrUS on October 12, 2011 and Korea ratifed the agreement 
on November 22, 2011. 
35 See Inside US trade (2010a). 
36 See www.reuters.com/article/2010/11/14/us-apec-korea-idUStrE6aD05L20101114
(accessed January 30, 2012). 
37 See Gwang-lip and Daily (2010). 
  
 
       
          
 
 









        









   
  




234 MEREDITH KOLSKY LEWIS 
would try to join the tPP negotiations.38 In addition to Noda, Banri
Kaieda, the head of MEtI, has spoken in favour of Japan’s participating,
indicating that joining the tPP would signal Japan’s openness to free trade, 
and would lead to more economic growth for Japan.39 Unsurprisingly,
this news has been greeted warmly by the Obama administration.
Farming interests object to Japan’s acceding to the tPP; however, some
have argued that Japan needs to join to ensure asia is available to replace 
Japan’s domestic market as a destination for Japanese products.40 
If Japan participates meaningfully with a willingness to liberalize its
agricultural sector, this would represent a sea change in Japanese policy.
However, Japan has been in a prolonged and persistent recession, and is
no longer the largest economy in asia. Japan clearly has concerns about
the rise of China, and is also increasingly on the back foot in its competi-
tive relationship with Korea, as Korea has formed many more Ftas than 
Japan has. Joining the tPP may therefore present Japan with an oppor-
tunity to improve its economic standing. 
Notwithstanding Noda’s statement that Japan will participate in the
negotiations, there are reasons to be doubtful about Japan’s prospects of
joining. Tere is a big diference between agreeing to sit at the table, and
making the difcult concessions the tPP partners may require. Domestic 
agricultural interests are unlikely to watch quietly. When Japan frst
announced it would enter into consultations (before deciding to fully
participate in negotiations) with current tPP partners, the organization 
of agricultural cooperatives (Zenchu) immediately lodged vociferous
objections, issuing a position paper stating: “our country’s agriculture
will be dramatically reduced and destroyed completely. regional econ-
omies and communities will also collapse including related industries … 
Te tPP will completely destroy not only agriculture but also forestry
and fsheries. Te most important things for us as human beings – our
lives and environment – will be made hollow and will be entrusted to
foreign countries.”41 Tis is broadly representative of the line Japan’s agri-
cultural interests have taken for decades. all of the combined pressures
of Japan’s trading partners in the WtO have only succeeded in getting
Japan to lower its tarifs on imported rice from their high of over 1000
percent to a current level of 788 percent.42 
38 See Harlan (2011). 39 See Nagata (2011). 
40 E.g., comments of Professor of Japanese politics at University of New South Wales,
aurelia George Mulgan, as reported in Wheatley (2011). 
41 42Quoted in Mulgam (2010). See Brasor (2011). 
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235 ACHIEVING A FREE TRADE Area 
Tus on the one hand, it makes all the sense in the world for Japan to
join the tPP, to get back on at least somewhat of an even playing feld
with Korea (which has negotiated far more Ftas than has Japan), and
try to jump-start its long-fagging economy by dropping its protectionist
policies and liberalizing its economy. On the other hand, Japan’s cur-
rent policies are deeply rooted in decades of policies aimed at protecting
farming interests and promoting food self-security. Tus, pursuing the
tPP would be a seismic policy shif for Japan. For these reasons, Japan’s
decision to join the talks should be viewed cautiously. Nonetheless, it is
a very important development and could lead to the agreement growing
signifcantly in members and importance. 
an analyst with the asian Development Bank has predicted that
aSEaN+6 and the tPP will ultimately merge together.43 Tis is a def-
inite possibility. It is hard to envision economies such as India or China
agreeing in the near-term to the comprehensive liberalization on trade
in goods that acceding to the tPP would entail. at the same time, it also
does not seem realistic that in the long-term there will be an FtaaP that
does not include China.44 Furthermore, should Korea and Japan agree
to join the tPP, it would not be in China’s interests to remain on the out-
side. In the short-term, while China has acknowledged the tPP, along
with aSEaN+3 and aSEaN+6, as a potential model for Pacifc trade lib-
eralization,45 it is not seeking to participate in the talks. China has also
never agreed to an Fta with the level of comprehensiveness of the P4
(and likely comprehensiveness of the tPP), and would likely want more
time before committing to such terms. In addition, China is unlikely
to seek to join an agreement shaped in large part by the United States.
43 See discussion of Ganeshan Wignaraja’s views in New York times online. available 
at www.nytimes.com/2011/02/15/business/global/15inside.html?_r=1&src=busln 
(accessed January 30, 2012). 
44 India is less certain, because India is at present not even a member of aPEC. although 
India has expressed signifcant interest in joining aPEC, aPEC’s current members, par-
ticularly China, have not been enthusiastic. India’s domestic constraints make it unlikely 
to be able to commit to completely comprehensive market opening to the world’s largest 
economies anytime in the near future. India’s Ftas thus far have included numerous
exclusions. For example, the just-announced Fta with Japan will not see India cutting
duties on Japanese auto parts. See www.moneycontrol.com/news/business/indo-japan-
fa-likely-to-be-implementedapril_524640.html (accessed January 30, 2012). 
45 The Wall Street Journal, “China Studying tPP; aPEC Green Goods Pledge Is
‘aspirational’” (November 14, 2011). available at: http://online.wsj.com/article/Bt-CO-
20111114–701145.html (accessed January 30, 2012). 
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Tus, while China may feel disadvantaged by not joining the tPP, at the
same time it seems unlikely for both political and substantive reasons
that China would in fact seek to do so. It is possible that these compet-
ing considerations will coalesce via an ultimate melding together of the
tPP with aSEaN+6, such that non-tPP members of aSEaN+6 phase
in their commitments over a longer and later time period. 
3.2.4
In addition to Japan, Canada and Mexico have recently announced their 
intent to join the negotiations. as noted above, Canada previously engaged 
in preliminary consultations with existing tPP participants; however, the 
current participants decided Canada was not sufciently able to com-
mit to the market access required. It remains to be seen whether the tPP 
members are now willing to accept less or Canada to give more. Indonesia, 
the Philippines and perhaps others have not made eforts to participate in 
these formative negotiations, but have expressed their interest in possibly 
joining at a later time.46 Te Philippines would have some of the same
labour issues Colombia faced with respect to the US–Colombia Fta,
and Indonesia has generally taken a protective approach to its agricul-
tural sector, so it is unclear whether these countries will be able to accede, 
should they ultimately seek to. 
3.2.5 Striking a balance 
Leading up to the 2011 aPEC Leaders’ Meeting, the current tPP par-
ties were anxious to advance their negotiations as quickly as possible,
in light of the original ambitious goal of completing the agreement by
the November meeting. Tus, the parties were cautious about expand-
ing the negotiations, particularly because several rounds of negotiations
have now been held, so adding new countries mid-process would be chal-
lenging.47 Te US has, from the onset of the negotiations, indicated that
new countries would need to express interest and commit to the requisite 
degree of commitments early in the process. at the same time, it has made 
clear it anticipates other countries joining at a later time, afer the initial
agreement is concluded.48 With nine negotiating rounds now concluded, 
the opportunity to join the agreement from the beginning may no longer 
be an option for those not already participating. In light of the work that 
has already been done, and the desire to conclude the agreement quickly, 
46 See Inside US trade (2010d). 
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this position seems reasonable. However, this approach may lead to some 
difculties with Japan, which would rather be able to negotiate the initial 
terms, rather than be faced with a take-it-or-leave-it completed deal.49 Te
tPP was not completed by the 2011 aPEC Leaders’ Meeting, and indeed 
the new target completion date of July 2012 seems overly optimistic.
Japan will therefore be joining the talks in progress; however, it is unclear 
to what extent Japan will be able to alter the negotiating framework or
reopen resolved issues. 
3.3 Qualitative considerations 
as discussed throughout this volume, the tPP aspires to be a more
comprehensive agreement than the vast majority of existing Ftas. For
countries weighing whether to join the tPP or to pursue an aSEaN-
driven or other model of integration, the comparative degrees of com-
prehensiveness and quality may be a signifcant factor. 
as noted in the introductory chapter, a high-quality agreement would 
include: (i) comprehensive scope of diverse topics; (ii) substantial geo-
graphical scope; (iii) considerable depth that includes cooperation and
integration components among members; and (iv) contain a set of shared 
values or norms among participants. While it remains to be seen how
comprehensively the tPP achieves these benchmarks, it is certain the aim 
of the participating members is to create such an agreement. 
Te aSEaN+3 and aSEaN+6 models are likely to difer signifcantly
from the tPP with respect to their trade liberalization aspirations.
aSEaN+3 and aSEaN+6 have been discussed as strategic linkages, with
free trade agreements a potential component – rather than the stated pur-
pose – of those bonds.50 aSEaN’s Ftas thus far have not been particularly
comprehensive, and analysts expect that neither aSEaN+3 nor aSEaN+6
would form a trade agreement that would be compliant with Gatt article
XXIV, the WtO provision that allows members to form Ftas as an excep-
tion to the general MFN requirement. article XXIV requires that agree-
ments cover “substantially all the trade” between the Fta partners.51 
While the term has not been defned in detail, “substantially all the trade”
is widely viewed as precluding the exclusion of entire sectors. In contrast,
the tPP participants promote their agreement as a comprehensive, high-
standards agreement that would presumably ft within the “substantially
all the trade” defnition found in Gatt article XXIV. Tus, for countries
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that have not yet negotiated an agreement that has required them to make
substantial commitments in agriculture, the tPP may not be viewed as a
realistic or desirable option. Te more gentle approach of aSEaN+ may
instead be more appealing. However, because the aSEaN+ models have
security and other non-trade components to them, an aSEaN+ model
and the tPP could both be pursued, side-by-side.52 
In addition to the comprehensiveness of sectoral coverage under the
tPP, for less developed countries, the non-trade aspects of the tPP –
heightened IP protections, a strong labour chapter, and stringent envir-
onmental provisions, among others – may entail more comprehensive
domestic reforms than are feasible in the short- or even medium-term.
For example, the tPP discussions suggest the parties are taking an active 
approach to trade in services. Under the WtO General agreement on 
trade in Services (GatS), members only made commitments under a
“positive list” approach, meaning no commitments were made unless
specifcally listed. In contrast, the tPP approach is a “negative list”
approach, meaning that unless specifcally excluded, all relevant services 
are included. 
It will be instructive to see how Viet Nam’s commitments are phased in 
under the tPP. Tis may give courage to countries such as the Philippines 
and Indonesia or may lead them to retreat. 
4 Conclusion 
Various models have been proposed for asian economic integration, and 
these are all potential candidates to expand into an ultimate FtaaP.
Most of these models have a number of commonalities, including the par-
ticipation of the three major East asian economies of China, Japan and
Korea; the lack of inclusion of the United States; and goals of security and 
other non-economic issues that may exceed the desire for deep economic 
liberalization. Te tPP provides a striking alternative. at present it does 
not defnitively feature China, Japan53 or Korea. It does include the United 
States, and it has as a major goal creating a high-standard, comprehensive 
trade agreement. Under these circumstances, countries in the region may 
prefer one model to the other. 
52 Ibid. 
53 as noted above, Japan’s participation is at a preliminary stage and may or may not result 





            
 
  
   
     
     
















239 ACHIEVING A FREE TRADE Area 
Tis chapter has attempted to identify some of the factors that may lead 
to preferences in one direction or the other, and to note that countries may 
elect to participate simultaneously in multiple of these models. Indeed, it 
is likely that plurilateral Ftas will be pursued in parallel: one will be the 
tPP and will not yet include China, but will include the United States
and other countries from the americas; and the other will feature the
aSEaN+3 or aSEaN+6 countries – thus including China, but no partici-
pants from the americas. It remains to be seen whether these two visions 
can be merged into a single FtaaP that would include the United States 
and China in the same agreement. 
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